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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, an employee of Citibank, N.A., accused the bank of illic-
itly moving funds out of Europe to avoid taxes there.' It was alleged
that the bank fabricated foreign currency trades among its branches at
noncompetitive rates, resulting in losses to Citibank's European
branches and profits to the bank's branch in the Bahamas. Because tax
rates in the Bahamas are substantially lower than in Europe,2 the bank
effectively doubled its profits on those funds by removing them from
the jurisdiction of the European countries involved.
As a result of these allegations, Citibank was investigated through-
out Europe and was assessed fines and back taxes; 3 no suits, however,
were brought against the bank in any court, despite the fact that the
funds leaving Europe are estimated at millions of dollars per year.'
Citibank is a United States-based company with branches world-
wide;5 similarly, many foreign banks operate branches in the United
States and in other countries, including the Bahamas. If Citibank is
moving funds out of the high-tax jurisdictions of Europe, it is not un-
likely that foreign banks are employing the same aggressive methods to
avoid United States taxes, which are comparable to those in Europe.6
Although the European governments involved in the Citibank in-
1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, col. 34; Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (1980); What Price Loyaly?, AM. LAw., Aug. 1982, at 1.
2. Compare a fifty-percent tax rate on corporate earnings in most industrialized coun-
tries with a zero to fifteen percent tax rate in many tax-haven countries.
3. Citibank agreed to pay Switzerland $5.65 million, for example. See N.Y. Times
Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, coL 3.
4. Id at coL 5-6.
5. According to Citicorp's 1980 annual report, Citibank had branches in 92 countries.
CrncoRP, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1981).
6. See supra note 2.
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cident resorted to quiet investigations and levying of fines, it is the con-
tention of this Note that the IRS already has in its arsenal a formidable
weapon to pursue and recover revenues lost by foreign banks removing
funds from the United States: section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7
Virtually unchanged since its enactment some sixty years ago,8
section 482 permits the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to reallo-
cate income among related entities either to prevent tax evasion or
more simply to reflect clearly the true income of the parties concerned. 9
To date, section 482 has been used in international settings primarily
against companies engaged in manufacturing;' 0 never has the section
been applied to a bank. The activities of merchants of goods are not so
dissimilar to the activities of merchants of money, however, and section
482 is sufficiently flexible to apply in both cases.
This Note examines the history of section 482 and argues for its
application where necessary to prevent international manipulation of
funds by foreign banks seeking to evade United States taxes.
II. FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRADING AND
ACCUSATIONS OF TAX EVASION
A. The Concepts Involved
1. Foreign Exchange Trading
Buying and selling foreign currencies'" are two of the activities of
a commercial bank, carried out through the foreign exchange depart-
ment of the bank by its dealers or traders. Foreign currency trading
rooms of banks and other financial institutions are located worldwide
in major financial centers.12 Linked by telephone and telex, traders buy
and sell millions of dollars worth of currency in the thousands of trans-
actions which take place daily.' 3
7. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 240(d) (1921).
9. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
10. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Comm'r, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Eli Lilly
& Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. C1. 1967); 67-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9248 (1967).
11. In this Note "foreign currency" means currency of any foreign country which is the
authorized medium of circulation and the basis for recordkeeping in that country.
12. For example, Paris, London, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Singapore, and
Zfirich. See generally I. WALTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 310-37 (1975),
13. Bank of America, the largest United States bank, earned $101 million in foreign
exchange profits in 1980. BANK AMERICA CORPORATION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1981);
Citibank, the second largest United States bank, earned $175 million in trading profits and
commissions in 1980. CITICORP, supra note 5, at 22.
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Whereas other departments of the bank determine what amounts
of which currencies are necessary to carry on the bank's business, the
responsibility of the foreign exchange department is to buy and sell
various currencies to meet these requirements and to do so at a profit.'4
Profit on a foreign exchange trade is made on the same theory as
in trading any commodity: buy low, sell high. Dealers engaging in
arbitrage buy an amount of currency which they then attempt to sell to
a third party at a higher price. The dealer thus acts as an intermediary
between the parties and, as in any business transaction, endeavors to do
so profitably. 5 These profits are income to the bank, institution, or
individual receiving the gain and are taxed accordingly by the appro-
priate authorities in the jurisdiction in which the profit is made. 6
In any business operated for profit, one method of maximizing
such profit is to minimize the taxes due on those profits. Various legal,
quasi-legal, and illegal methods are used; tax shelters, 17 income defer-
ral, 18 splitting of income,19 and transfer pricing are but a few of these
methods.
2. Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing is a method of tax minimization which has flour-
ished in international trade of all types of commodities.20 Regardless
14. Campbell and O'Connor, Taxation of Foreign Exchange Acti ities of Commercial
Banks, 7 TAx ADVISER 541 (1976).
15. For example, one million dollars of United States currency (51 million) bought for
4.5 million French francs (FF) and sold for FF4.6 million nets a profit of FF0.1 million, or
approximately U.S. $22,000. (The exchange rate used for this example is hypothetical).
16. Income from foreign exchange trades is taxed as ordinary income because the trades
are generally short term, not held for investment, and therefore not eligible for capital gains
treatment. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1976).
17. Tax shelter is a general term encompassing various methods for protecting income,
some of which are legal, such as oil depletion allowances, I.R.C. §§ 611-14 (1976), and some
of which are illegal, such as transferring funds abroad to secret accounts to avoid taxes.
18. Income deferral is the reporting of income in a year other than that in which the
income is eamed; Congress has made some exceptions to the general rule against income
deferral. I.R.C. § 451(a)-(d) (1976).
19. Income splitting is the fragmentation of income among several taxpayers with the
object of reducing total taxes due by avoiding high marginal tax rates imposed on high
incomes. See, ag., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2 C.B.
25.
20. Transfer pricing includes not only the sale of tangible property ranging all the
way from raw materials to intermediate and finished goods, but also the pricing of
money (loans), services (research and development, consulting, managerial assist-
ance), the use of tangible property (equipment, buildings) and the transfer or use of
intangible property (patents, copyrights, trademarks, procedures, forecasts, esti-
mates, customer lists).
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of whether the commodity is tangible or intangible, the principle of
transfer pricing remains the same: the producer of a commodity, lo-
cated in a jurisdiction with relatively high tax rates, exports the product
at an artificially low price to an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction. The
affiliate then sells the product to the ultimate consumer at a fair market
price. The difference between the abnormally low price which the affil-
iate paid the producer and the normal market price at which the affili-
ate sold to the consumer is recorded by the affiliate as a profit; that
profit is taxed at the relatively low rate prevailing in the affiliate's juris-
diction. Conversely, the meager profit shown by the producer of the
commodity is taxed at the relatively high rate prevailing in the pro-
ducer's jurisdiction. The net result is protection of a large part of the
producer's overall profit from the exorbitant tax rates of the producer's
home country by shifting the profit to the affiliate, thereby reducing its
taxes.2' Thus, transfer pricing is a means of transferring a profit from a
high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction through price manipula-
tion; the purpose is illicit sheltering of profits from taxation.
3. Tax-Haven Countries and Offshore Banking
Most industrialized countries, like the United States, tax corporate
earnings at a rate of approximately fifty percent.22 In contrast, a grow-
ing number of small countries around the world (the so-called tax-ha-
ven countries)23 which are generally rich in neither land, industry, nor
natural resources have made their laws and tax rates attractive to busi-
nesses seeking to escape the prying tax authorities of their native indus-
trialized lands.24 The Bahamas is a classic example; land-poor, its
principal industry is tourism. The protective provisions of the Baha-
Keegan, Multinational Pricing: How Far is Arm's Length?, 4 COLUM. J. OF WORLD BUS.,
May-June 1969, at 57.
21. Sheltered profits can then be used for investment overseas, or laundered through
holding companies or secret accounts and funneled back to the producer.
22. In 1982, the United States income tax rate on corporate income over $100,000 was
46%. I.R.C. § 11(b)(5) (1982). The corresponding rate in France was 50%, and in West
Germany, 49%. PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., CORPORATE TAXES IN 70 COUNTRIES 54, 57
(1973).
23. For example, the Bahama Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Turks
and Caicos, Nauru, and New Hebrides. Offshore Tax Havens: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979)
(statement of M. Carr Ferguson).
24. The benefit to the tax-haven countries lies not only in the tax revenue obtained from
the corporations resident there, but also from the jobs created and funds flowing through the




mian Banks and Trust Company Act of 196515 seek to shield commer-
cial and investment activities in the Bahamas from the inquiries of
foreign governments. Furthermore, there is no tax on earnings of Ba-
hamian business entities.26 A company recording a profit in the Baha-
mas, therefore, would retain an additional fifty percent of its profits
after tax as compared with a comparable company operating in the
United States.27
Sheltering profits earned as interest on loans is one form of trans-
fer pricing.28 The parent company of a financial organization such as a
bank could administer a loan from its head office in the United States
for example, yet cable a message to one of its branches located in a tax-
haven country and order disbursement of the funds to the borrower.
Interest earned on the loan would be recorded by the tax-haven branch
and taxed there as well, at a rate significantly lower than in the United
States. This is the principle behind offshore banking.
If loan funds may be so easily shifted by cable messages, and thus
render bookkeeping entries a sham, the possibility arises that profits
from other banking activities could be shifted from one country to an-
other at the will of the bank seeking to maximize its profits by minimiz-
ing its taxes. Among the funds so shifted could be the profits from
foreign exchange transactions. The mechanism for moving the funds
would be similar to that employed in transfer pricing: prearranged
transactions orchestrated by the parent company through its affiliate or
subsidiary in a tax-haven country. It is just such a system which Ci-
tibank was accused of operating in 1976 to avoid paying taxes on its
foreign exchange profits.29
B. The Charges Levied
On February 9, 1978, David Edwards, a vice president in the inter-
national division of Citibank, N.A., was dismissed shortly after meeting
with the bank's board of directors to discuss his allegations of wrong-
doing in foreign currency trading by Citibank's European branches.' °
25. The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 1965 (Bahamas).
26. PRICE-WATERHOUSE & Co., DOING BUSINESS IN THE BAHAMAs 23 (1975).
27. Although the Bahamas seems to be losing money through such modest tax rates,
such accommodation is one of the few incentives the country has to offer companies to
locate there; 15% of the companies' profits are better than 50% of no profits if the companies
went elsewhere.
28. See generally Keegan, supra note 20.
29. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1979, at 23, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
30. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at 1, col. 5; Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553,
425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1980); What Price Loyalt,?, supra note 1, at 1, 8.
19831
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Since March 1977, Edwards had sought to bring attention to his
charges that through contrived foreign exchange deals between
branches, profit from currency trading had been systematically shifted
from high-tax jurisdictions in Europe to the tax-free Bahamas, thereby
circumventing European tax laws to maximize bank profits.
3t
In their February 1978 meeting with Edwards, however, Ci-
tibank's board of directors declined to investigate Edwards' allegations
of illegal activity. Edwards was then dismissed, reportedly because he
had acted "in a manner . . detrimental to the best interests of Ci-
tibank. '32 In response, Edwards filed a $14 million suit against Ci-
tibank on July 24, 1978,33 charging breach of contract and wrongful
discharge "in reprisal for plaintiff [Edwards] having uncovered evi-
dence of illegal foreign currency manipulation. 3 4 Although motion
for summary judgment was granted to defendant Citibank and af-
firmed on appeal, the publicity surrounding the suit focused attention
on the information about Citibank's activities as revealed in Edwards'
pleadings.35
Among the documents filed with the court by Edwards were confi-
dential memoranda purportedly written by upper-level Citibank of-
ficers in Europe. The memoranda described the mechanism for
shifting, or "parking," the foreign exchange profits out of Europe. One
such memorandum stated that transferring such funds to the Nassau,
Bahamas branch of Citibank was done to transfer taxable profits gener-
ated abroad to a tax-haven area.36 Another memorandum called for
caution in conducting the parking operation because there was the po-
tential risk of discovery and retaliatory action by host country authori-
ties. The memorandum warned that correspondence between the
31. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, col. 4; see also What Price Loyalty?, supra note 1,
at 1, 8. Another reason for wishing to circumvent local authorities' knowledge of the bank's
foreign currency positions is to prevent the authorities from discovering that at the end of a
trading day, the bank is holding more than the legally allowed amounts of local currency
and, thus, possibly affecting both interest rates and trading prices within the country. See i
32. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, col. 2 (quoting David Edwards).
33. Jittersfrom the Citibank Case, Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1978, at 94.
34. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1979), a id, 74
A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1980).
35. Although plaintiff [Edwards] does allege a breach of contract as one of his
causes of action, his pleadings are complicated by inclusion of detailed allegations
and background material concerning the alleged reason for defendant's [Ci-
tibank's] decision wrongfully to discharge him and somewhat deficient in fully
pleading the elements of a binding employment contract. . ..
74 A.D.2d at 554-55, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 329 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
36. The purpose of the transfer could also have been to comply with local regulatory
requirements. See supra note 31; see also Wall St. J., July 27, 1978, at 13, col, 1.
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Citibank branches would make obvious the nature of the trans-
actions.37
In addition to such incriminating but inconclusive documents, Ed-
wards introduced into the court record information on specific foreign
exchange deals which allegedly were carried out in furtherance of the
profit-parking scheme. European branches allegedly sold foreign cur-
rency to the Nassau branch at such low, noncompetitive rates that Nas-
sau consistently showed a substantial profit on such transactions.38
Allegations of this systematic movement of untaxed funds out of
Europe naturally interested authorities both in the United States and in
the countries mentioned in Edwards' suit against Citibank: France, It-
aly, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Switzerland.39 As a result, the audit committee of the board of
directors of Citicorp4° authorized its own investigation of the
allegations.4 1
The final report of the audit committee, issued in late 1978, con-
cluded that Citibank was not guilty of an "institutional pattern" of
37. Wall St. J., July 27, 1978, at 13, CoL 1. Jittersfrom the Citibank Case,supra note 33,
at 94.
38. For example, Mr. Edwards claimed that on June 11, 1976, Citibank's office in Paris
cabled the New York office with complete instructions for carrying out a round of buying
and selling various currencies among the Paris, New York, Brussels, and Nassau branches at
predetermined exchange rates not then prevailing on the open market. Specifically, Paris
cabled New York with instructions for the Nassau traders to buy U.S.S6 million from Paris
in exchange for French francs (FF) at an artificially low rate of 4.7275 FF/U.S.S, or
FF28.365 million; then Nassau was to sell the just-purchased U.S.S6 million to New York
(U.S.S4 million) and Brussels (U.S.$2 million) at a higher rate of 4.7375 FF/U.S.S, or
FF28.425 million. The difference between the amount in francs which Nassau took in from
New York and Brussels (FF28A25 million) and sent out to Paris (FF28.365 million) is
FF60,000, worth about U.S.$12,500, and is recorded in the Nassau books as a profit. In the
final step of the transaction, Paris is to close the loop by buying the U.S.S6 million from
Brussels and New York in exchange for francs at the same higher rate of 4.7375 FF/U.S.S
that prevailed between New York/Brussels and Nassau. Therefore, New York and Brussels
show no gain or loss, having bought and then sold a commodity (U.S.S) at the same price;
however, the FF60,000 profit in Nassau now corresponds to a FF60,000 trading loss on the
books of the Paris branch. Sixty thousand French francs have been smoothly transferred
from Europe to the tax-haven Bahamas, reducing taxable income in France. See also How
Citibank "Parks" Its Money, NATION 573 (1978); Jitters from the Citibank Care, sapra note
33, at 94; Playing the Money Game, TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 67; and lhat Price Lopalty?,
supra note 1, at 1, for a discussion of off-market rates.
39. Wall St. J., July 27, 1978, at 13, col. 1; Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1978, at 4, col. 2.
40. Citicorp is a holding company and the sole shareholder of Citibank, N.A. Crr-
icoRP, supra note 5, at 16.
41. Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1978, at 4, col. 2. The investigation was conducted by
Shearman & Sterling, Citicorp's outside legal counsel, and Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
an accounting firm which is also Citibank's external auditor. For a critical discussion of the
Shearman & Sterling report, see What Price Loalty,? supra note 1, at 1.
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transferring tax liabilities from one country to another in violation of
various European tax laws. The report, however, did list some specific
instances where local counsel overseas advised that "tax challenges in-
volving particular transactions would appear to have a high probability
of success."42 The report confirmed Edwards' contentions that between
1973 and 1980, several Citibank branches circumvented European tax
laws by causing the New York and Nassau branches of Citibank to
record on their books thousands of artificial foreign exchange
purchases, sales, or deposits.4 a
Various European governments also investigated Citibank's trad-
ing activities, negotiated with the bank, and accepted monetary settle-
ments for past transgressions." United States governmental agencies
also inquired into Citibank's foreign exchange trading practices; by
January 1979, reviews were underway both by the Comptroller of the
Currency, who has overall responsibility for bank regulation, and by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which oversees the
affairs of publicly traded corporations like Citicorp.4 5 The three-year
investigation by the SEC produced a staff report concluding that be-
tween 1973 and 1980,46 Citibank had improperly shifted at least $46
million in foreign exchange profits from Europe to the Bahamas and
that Citibank had since paid $11 million in back taxes to European
governments.4 7 The SEC report also revealed the origin of the funds-
parking scheme: a 1975 internal Citibank study recommending crea-
tion of the dual set of bank records and use of prearranged telex
messages to shift funds to Nassau. 8
42. Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1978 at 4, Col. 2.
43. The report continued:
mhe transactions were completely controlled by the European branches and usu-
ally involved artificial prices . . . . Until 1975, transactions were at '[currency
exchange] rates completely outside the range of actual transactions for that day;'
from 1975 to 1978, they were still 'off-market,' or arbitrary, but within the price
range of other daily transactions; from 1978 through 1980, the parking transactions
were booked at market rates. . . . After 1977, the parking was done by telephone,
so that 'no record' of the transaction 'ever appeared on the European branch's
books' shown to the local authorities.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, col. 3-4 (quoting Citibank staff report).
44. For example, Citibank agreed to pay Switzerland $5.65 million after a showing that
the bank had transferred $7.5 million from Switzerland to Nassau via artificial foreign ex-
change trades between 1974 and 1978. Similarly, French authorities claimed $550,000 had
been improperly shifted from Citibank Paris to Nassau.
45. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at DIO, col. 6.
46. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, col. 3-4.
47. Id
48. Id at col. 3-6. The bank study is quoted as stating, "Strictly confidential treatment
is necessary . . . [because] disclosure could mean instructions to discontinue, and most
[Vol, 6
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The SEC staff report recommended a public proceeding to deter-
mine the adequacy of Citicorp's disclosures under federal securities
law.49 However, officials of the SEC rejected the recommendation and
declined to take action against the bank because they regarded the evi-
dence of violations as "insignificant and harmless," and stated that "it
would be inappropriate to allege disclosure violations based on
unadjudicated illegal or improper conduct by a company's officers and
directors unless there were affirmative representations as to manage-
ment's honesty and integrity in some document."5 According to the
New York Times, however, an unnamed source at the SEC has sug-
gested that United States authorities are not interested in pursuing the
issue because it is European governments and not the United States
which have sustained the revenue loss. 5 1
III. HYPOTHETICAL
Although no formal charges were brought by any foreign govern-
ments against Citibank regarding alleged foreign currency manipula-
tion, the fact that the bank paid some $11 million in fines and back
taxes to those governments can be construed as an acknowledgement
by the bank that David Edwards' allegations were correct. Given the
ease with which the profit-parking scheme can be carried out,52 the tre-
mendous tax savings which can result,53 and the minimal chance of
detection and punishment,54 one would expect that shifting foreign ex-
[probably] involve tax claims and penalties." The SEC report criticized the Citicorp investi-
gation conducted by Shearman & Sterling and Peat Marwick as being "part of the problem,
not part of the solution," because it was "incomplete, false, and misleading." Id at col. 6.
Key to this charge by the SEC is their contention that neither European governments nor
foreign attorneys who assisted in preparation of the Citibank report were provided with
complete information or documentation regarding the practices and deals in question; had
full information been given, "such knowledge could potentially have changed the additional
tax assessments into more serious charges," such as criminal tax evasion. Id at col. 4.
49. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at D6, coL 2.
50. Id at col. 1.
51. 1d; see also What Price Loyaly?, supra note 1, at I.
52. For example, the bank could use coded telexes to implement its profit-parking
scheme.
53. The differential corporate tax rates between industrialized countries and tax-haven
countries are substantial. For example, France and West Germany levy a 50% tax on corpo-
rate earnings, the United Kingdom 52% and Italy 27%; whereas the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, and Uanutu charge nothing, and the Channel Islands charge a flat rate of £300 per
annum. PRICE WATERHOUSE & CO., CORPORATE TAxEs: A WORLD WIDE SUMMARYPaI-
sirn (January, 1983).
54. Witness Citibank's penalties paid as a result of the Edwards' revelations: eleven
million dollars as of early 1982. Playing the Mfoney Game, TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 67; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at 30, col. 3.
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change profits to avoid taxation is not uncommon. Given the status of
the United States as an important center of international financial ac-
tivity, one would also be surprised if there were not international banks
evading taxes on their United States-source foreign exchange profits by
shifting the funds out of the United States in the same manner that
Citibank apparently took profits out of Europe. By constructing a hy-
pothetical situation in which a non-United States bank with branches
in New York and the Bahamas might illicitly move profits from New
York to the tax-haven Bahamas, this Note will explore what action the
United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could take in pursuing
and recapturing lost tax revenue.
Let us assume the existence of a large" French bank based in
Paris, with branch offices worldwide including one each in New York
City and the Bahamas. The bank deals extensively in foreign curren-
cies. Each branch makes hundreds of trades each day with other
branches of the bank and with unrelated third parties. The New York
branch is especially active in foreign exchange trading because New
York is a politically stable financial center in an increasingly unstable
world and also because of the primacy of the United States dollar as a
medium of international trade.
The Nassau branch of the bank is similarly active, but for different
reasons. Just as the unstable political climate worldwide draws inves-
tors to New York, the Draconian tax measures of most of the industri-
alized world, including the United States, have driven some seventy
international banks to open offices in the Bahamas.5 6 Thus, taxes can
be evaded through offshore booking of loans57 and parking of foreign
exchange profits. Aggressively searching for shelters to protect its prof-
its, the head office of this hypothetical French bank devises a scheme
similar to the one alleged by David Edwards to be operating at Ci-
tibank. In order to move foreign exchange profits made by the New
York traders out of the high-tax United States jurisdiction and into the
55. One hundred billion dollars in assets, comparable to Citibank or Bank of America,
CITICORP, supra note 5, at 33 (assets of $115 billion); BANKAMERICA CORPORATION, 1980
ANNUAL REPORT 33 (assets of $112 billion).
56. Offshore Tax Havens: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) (statement of M. Carr
Ferguson).
57. Offshore banks "book" or record loans in the tax-haven branches to give the ap-
pearance that the loans were actually made in the tax-haven. Thus, the interest earned on
the loan would be taxable there as well. Offshore Tax Havens. Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 20 (1979)
(statement of M. Carr Ferguson).
[Vol. 6
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books of the branch in the low-tax Bahamas, a plan is created and sent
by memo to top personnel at the New York and Nassau branches.
When New York has approximately $50,000 in profits from its foreign
exchange trading above and beyond a small but respectable amount of
profit to be kept for "show," traders in the New York branch will cable
the head office in Paris under a special telex coding that New York
wishes to transfer the $50,000 "quietly" out of New York and to the
Bahamas. Paris offers to buy the currency from New York at a rate less
favorable to New York than it could have received on the open market,
and New York accepts the bid; a trade is concluded, with Paris showing
a profit and New York a loss compared to prevailing market rates.
Paris in turn cables Nassau, again under a special telex coding, and
Nassau buys the $50,000 worth of currency at a price favorable to itself
and unfavorable to Paris; yet Paris will break even, because the two
trades will "wash," in other words, the loss to Nassau will exactly offset
the gain from the New York trade. New York has reduced its taxable
income by $50,000; Nassau has increased its taxable income by the
same amount. With the differential between the United States and the
Bahamian tax rates, the bank has protected and saved $25,000 in
United States tax at a cost of only a few overseas telexes. The United
States government loses tax revenue not only on this set of prearranged
foreign exchange trades, but on dozens like it by the same New York
branch of this hypothetical bank. The IRS conducts periodic audits of
persons and entities paying tax or doing business in the United States;
foreign banks and businesses are liable for United States income tax on
United States-source income5" and, therefore, may be audited to ensure
reporting of income and payment of taxes due.59
For example, assume that the hypothetical bank is audited by the
IRS, and a number of the prearranged foreign exchange deals with
Paris are discovered.' Are these deals illegal? The hypothetical bank
would naturally wish to characterize the funds transfer as tax avoid-
ance, or a matter of common sense much like the logic behind invest-
ing one's own savings in tax-free municipal bonds or a tax-deferred
Individual Retirement Account. In other words, why pay unnecessary
taxes?
The IRS, however, would predictably take the opposite point of
view, that spiriting profits out of the United States runs afoul of the
58. I.R.C. § 882 (1976).
59. I.R.C. § 6103 (1976).
60. That is, buy and sell rates were used which were outside the rates prevailing in the
open market that day among unrelated buyers and sellers of currency.
19831
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intent of the United States tax laws and thus constitutes tax evasion.
After all, if the bank were certain of the legality of the funds transfer
mechanism, why would it use coded telexes and mysterious in-house
bank memoranda urging secrecy in the operation?
Whether profit-parking is proper tax avoidance or improper tax
evasion is a question yet to be addressed in United States courts, for the
IRS has not to date filed any deficiency notices against foreign banks
operating in the United States which have resulted in court action on
these grounds. To avoid the expense of litigation, banks might opt to
settle with the IRS and pay fines as Citibank did with several European
governments. If, however, such a suit were to proceed to court, on
what basis would the IRS claim a right to tax the profits purloined out
of the United States? It is the contention of this Note that section 482 of
the Internal Revenue Code would be an appropriate vehicle on which
the IRS could ride to victory. Although section 482 has not previously
been applied to retrieval of parked foreign exchange profits, a brief
study of section 482 and its purpose and history show that it may ar-
guably be so employed.
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 482
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, appor-
tion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
61
This single, somewhat lengthy sentence comprises the whole of
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. The predecessor of the pres-
ent-day section 482 was enacted in 1921,62 and although the language
of the section has changed little since then, section 482 has today as-
sumed an importance not likely foreseen upon its enactment some sixty
years ago.
A direct tax on income was not permitted in the United States
63
61. I.R.C. § 482 (1976). For an in-depth discussion of the origins and history of section
482, see 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 38 (1983).
62. I.R.C. § 240(d) (1921).
63. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
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until 1916, with ratification of the sixteenth amendment." Until that
time, the government raised money primarily through customs and ex-
cise duties on commonly used goods;65 the resulting feeling in the coun-
try was that corporations with their large concentrations of capital and
wholly untaxed incomes were not contributing their fair share to the
upkeep of the government.66 This feeling ran so strongly that after rati-
fication of the sixteenth amendment legalizing direct taxation of both
personal and corporate income, Congress enacted a provision for the
taxation of capital stock of corporations in an effort to reach what was
apparently perceived as "idle wealth."'67 At the time, many corpora-
tions were neither listed on stock exchanges nor were their shares fre-
quently sold.68 Difficulty arose in estimating the value of the capital
stock in order to tax it. The Internal Revenue Bureau69 reacted by issu-
ing a new guideline, Regulation 50,70 which calculated the capital stock
tax on a figure easily ascertainable: the net assets of a corporation. It
soon became apparent, however, that this system resulted in double
taxation of holding companies7 and their affiliated organizations be-
cause the assets of a holding company consist solely of the stock of its
subsidiary corporations, whose stock was also being taxed in its own
right.7
2
This situation was remedied in 1921 when Congress enacted a new
internal revenue act. 3 Section 240(d) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the forerunner of present-day section 482, permitted the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue "for the purpose of making an accurate distribu-
tion or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital,
[to] consolidate the accounts of . . . related trades and busi-
nesses. . ."I The motive of Congress was not solely to alleviate
double taxation; Congress was also aware that some method was
needed to prevent arbitrary shifting of profits among related businesses
64. U.S. Const. amend. XVL
65. H.R. 416, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1912).
66. S. Rep. No. 765, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
67. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 407, 39 Stat. 756.
68. Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on IMays and
Means, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 343 (1921) (statement of Hugh Satterlee) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
69. Predecessor of the present-day Internal Revenue Service.
70. Treas. Reg. 50 (1918).
71. A holding company is a corporation whose assets consist of the shares of stock of
another corporation(s).
72. Hearings, supra note 68, at 347.
73. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 240(d), 42 Stat. 227, 260.
74. I.R.C. § 45 (1943).
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to avoid taxes," "particularly in the case of subsidiary corporations or-
ganized as foreign trade corporations."76 This attitude was clearly
spelled out in 1926, when Congress added a phrase to section 240(d), to
the effect that the Commissioner was "authorized" to reallocate income
or deductions among related businesses if necessary "to prevent eva-
sion of taxes. .. .
Despite these ominous changes in tone, however, the stark and
unadorned section 240(d), now renumbered section 45, remained other-
wise virtually unchanged for many years. Lacking regulations from the
Internal Revenue Bureau to delineate its purpose and application, the
section was little used.
The first application of section 45 in an international context was
in 1928, in which the tax court required an American corporation to
submit tax returns incorporating data from its Mexican affiliate. 78 The
court's purpose was to permit United States tax authorities to better
assess the true income of the United States parent company.
In 1934, thirteen years after enactment of the original section
240(d), the Treasury Department at last issued regulations interpreting
the section once referred to as a "'silent policeman'-to insure obedi-
ence of the law."79 The regulations plainly expressed for the first time
that the purpose of the section was to place a controlled taxpayer (I e.,
an affiliate or subsidiary) on the same tax basis with an uncontrolled,
third-party taxpayer:80
The authority to determine true net income extends to any case in
which either by inadvertence or design the taxable net income, in
whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would have
been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncon-
trolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled
taxpayer."1
The second application of section 45, in 1935, was in an interna-
tional setting, but this time it involved a more complex notion, the use
of transfer pricing to escape taxation. In Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Dela-
ware) Ltd v. Commissioner,82 the United States subsidiary of a foreign
75. Until enactment of the sixteenth amendment, tax avoidance by shifting profits was
unnecessary because there was no tax on income.
76. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 240(d), 42 Stat. 265.
77. I.R.C. § 45 (1934).
78. I.T. 2261, 5-1 C.B. 100 (1926), mod#Fedby I.T. 2394, 7-1 C.B. 177 (1928).
79. 1933-1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 435.015, at 845 (Jan. 1, 1933).
80. Treas. Reg. 86, § 45-1(b) and (c), 1934-2 C.B. 123.
81. Id
82. 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1935), af'd, 31 B.T.A. 1152, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935).
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corporation sold stock at cost to another (foreign) subsidiary, which
immediately sold to another party at a substantial profit. The court
held that the profit should be reallocated to the United States subsidi-
ary to comply with the arm's length requirement and to prevent eva-
sion of taxes.83
In the two decades before 1941, various versions of section 45 were
in existence,84 yet the section had been applied on the average only
once a year during that time. In that year, however, one writer pro-
phetically remarked, "The provisions of Sec. 45, though sparingly ap-
plied in the past, become increasingly important when tax-savings
methods become the target of scrutiny, as they are at present. The
question of moment therefore, is as to what extent 'minimizing taxes'
can be affected by Sec. 45. " 86
After World War II and during the 1950's, American companies
expanded abroad energetically and established foreign manufacturing,
sales, and licensing businesses. Often corporate taxes were lower
abroad than in the United States, and thus there was an incentive to
shift profits abroad to avoid income taxes and effectively double the
amount of money available for investment and growth abroad.87 New
sophistication by United States companies overseas eventually goaded
Congress in 1962 to direct the Treasury Department to "explore the
possibility of developing and promulgating regulations . . . which
would provide additional guidelines and formulas for the allocation of
income and deductions in cases involving foreign income."8 ,,
The principle of "arm's length transaction," originally mentioned
in the 1934 regulations, was at last to find explication and the potential
for full application in the fifteen pages of regulations which the IRS
finalized in 1968.89 The detailed new regulations include, unchanged,
the 1934 definitions, scope, purpose, and intended application" of the
section. They also discuss at length methods of reallocating income,
deductions, credits, and allowances in accord with the general principle
83. Id at 236.
84. I.R-C. § 240(d) (1921, 1924); I.R.C. § 240(f) (1926); I.I.C. § 45 (1928, 1932, 1934,
1936, 1938, 1943); LR.C. § 482 (1954).
85. FED. TAX SERv. (CCH) (1923-41).
86. 1941 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 435.001 (Jan. 1, 1941).
87. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962).
88. Id
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 to -2 (1968). Jenks, Treasury Regulaions Under Section 482,
23 TAX LAW. 279, 280 (1970).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)-(d) (1981).
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that substance will prevail over form.91 Finally, detailed guidelines are
provided for determining proper taxable income of related taxpayers.
Such income is classified by the type of transaction which has occurred:
loans and advances, performance of services, use of tangible property,
transfer or use of intangible property, and sale of tangible property.92
Although the wording of section 482 has remained virtually un-
changed for sixty years, the interpretation and application of its simple,
straightforward provisions has expanded with the increasingly complex
and sophisticated nature of United States business both at home and
abroad. The next section of this Note will explore relevant cases and
argue for the extension of the ambit of section 482 to include the trans-
ferring abroad of United States-earned income from foreign exchange
activities by foreign banks.
V. APPLICATION OF SECTION 482
To date, section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code has not been
applied in any adjudicated case to reallocate a bank's income to re-
cover taxes lost through foreign exchange profits shifted out of the
United States. The application of section 482 has remained linked pri-
marily to cases of foreign subsidiaries created to engage with their do-
mestic United States parent company in transfer pricing of tangible
goods. It is the contention of this Note, however, that sufficiently close
parallels exist to provide the basis for the IRS to use section 482 to
pursue and recapture the tax revenues lost in an arrangement such as
that previously outlined in the hypothetical.93 The IRS could treat for-
eign exchange profits the same as profits from the sale of a commodity
in any transfer pricing scheme.
Over the last sixty years, several issues have arisen in case law ap-
plying section 482; these are addressed below.
A. Main Issues
1. Trade or Business
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is empowered to reallo-
cate the income of organizations, trades, and businesses; thus, the hy-
pothetical bank must fit within this category for section 482 to apply.
The IRS would face little difficulty in this respect. As a wholly owned
subsidiary of the hypothetical parent bank, the New York branch is
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (1981). See also Jenks, supra note 89, at 281,
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1981).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
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well within previous determinations of what entities constitute a trade
or business. For example, holding companies,94 partnerships, corpora-
tions, and even individuals95 all qualify as trades or businesses. Fur-
thermore, although many of the cases relying on section 482 concern
domestic United States parent companies and their foreign subsidiar-
ies, section 482 also applies to a foreign parent,9 6 such as in the
hypothetical.
2. Owned or Controlled
Section 482 states that income may be reallocated by the Commis-
sioner between trades or businesses "owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests. '' 97 The question is how much control
by the parent company over the subsidiary is necessary to bring the
hypothetical bank and its subsidiary within the reach of section 482.
Stated conversely, what degree of autonomy by the branch will permit
escape from reallocation of the shifted profits by section 482?
. The general rule, as stated by Justice Harlan Stone in 1940, in
Helvering v. Horst, is that "power to dispose of income is the
equivalent of ownership of it."98 As a subsidiary of the parent French
bank, the New York branch logically is under the command of the par-
ent, and by extension, the income of the branch is also subject to the
direction of the parent.
The parent bank can be expected to argue that the parent and the
branch are indeed separate entities, as evidenced perhaps by a loose
corporate structure. Under Simon J Murpt,, the Commissioner may
not combine or consolidate the separate income of two separate organi-
zations merely because they are owned or controlled by the same inter-
est.9 9 If the income of each of the hypothethical branches is truly
discrete, the IRS may not consolidate or reallocate income. With this
rule, however, comes a caveat: section 482 will apply if "the relation-
ship [of] the original distribution between the two entities, as reflected
by the books, is in substance a fictitious one, improperly reflecting form
94. Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1935).
95. Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1515, 1519 (1981) (quoting
Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1(a)(1) (1968)); Ach v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), a Fd, 358 F.2d 342
(6th Cir. 1966); Cooper v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 576 (1975).
96. See Asiatic Petroleum, supra note 94, at 236.
97. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
98. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940).
99. Simon J. Murphy Co. v. Comm'r, 231 F.2d 639, 644 (6th Cir. 1956). See also Cedar
Valley Distillery v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 870, 876 (1951); Seminole Flavor Co. v. Comm'r, 4
T.C. 1215, 1232-35 (1945).
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instead of substance.' ' "° Such "colusive"10' activity as the prear-
ranged telex scheme among the branches of the hypothetical bank
would place the activity squarely within the caveat of Simon J Murphy.
In the terminology of a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the branch has
become the "handmaiden"' 102 of the parent, and reallocation of the
shifted profits is proper.
Another argument that the bank might raise against application of
section 482 in the hypothetical situation is that because of work actu-
ally done by the Bahamian branch, the shifting transaction is not a
sham, and at least some of the profit should accrue to the Bahamian
branch, providing a partial tax shelter. This argument was successful
in Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. ,103 in which the income of a subsidiary
was not wholly allocated to the parent company despite the parent's
total control and complete discretion over the operation of the subsidi-
ary. The Tax Court found that the subsidiary had indeed performed
work. Thus, the transaction was not a sham, and the subsidiary de-
served to retain a fair percentage of its profits.1t 4 The parent bank in
the hypothetical encounters a factual problem in bearing out this argu-
ment, however, because in fact the branch has done no work in forming
or executing a foreign exchange contract. If the contract were origi-
nally made by the parent with a third party and transferred to the
branch for execution, the branch could plausibly argue that it had in-
curred expense on the parent's behalf and was owed a proportional
amount of the profit; however, that is not the case. The branch has
incurred the expense of telex cables to and from the parent and the
New York branch, but only in furtherance of the profit-parking scheme
and not in a bona fide business deal.
Finally, courts have held that indirect control by the parent is suf-
ficient to bring the profit-shifting within the scope of section 482.10
Thus, even if the head office of the hypothetical bank were not directly
involved in some of the parking transactions taking place among the
branches, the fact that the parent had instigated the scheme and perpet-
uated its existence would be sufficient control for section 482 to
apply."°
100. Simon J. Murphy, 231 F.2d at 644.
101. Id at 645.
102. Foster v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 34 (1983).
103. Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 601, 620 (1964).
104. Id at 621-22.
105. Sunshine Dep't Stores v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1379, 1384 (1981).
106. Id Additionally, the parent company need not have controlled the subsidiary for




Section 482 provides for reallocation of income if "necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect income.""', The
section says nothing, however, to guide courts in determining where
clever business practice stops and tax evasion or income distortion be-
gins. To aid in analysis, courts over the last thirty years have generally
evaluated each business situation in which the IRS wished to apply
section 482 by looking first for a "sound business reason"'10 8 for a com-
pany's formation of a foreign subsidiary. Two of the reasons found
acceptable are ease of administration over widespread geographic re-
gions °9 and insulation of the parent company from liability or loss for
a risky venture undertaken abroad." 0 Another "bona fide business
purpose""' is tax avoidance: "Whether the primary reason for its [the
subsidiary's] existence and conduct of business was to avoid U.S. taxes
or to permit more economical performance of contracts. . . makes no
difference.. . . Any one of these reasons would constitute a valid
business purpose for its existence . ..2
The virtue of having a judicially recognized business purpose lies
in preventing the IRS from summarily classifying the subsidiary as a
sham, consolidating all of its income with that of the domestic par-
ent," 3 and thus subjecting the entire amount to United States taxation.
If, however, the subsidiary is able to establish a bona fide business pur-
pose, the IRS is forced to document either tax evasion or distorted re-
flection of the parent company's income as a result of the subsidiary
operation.'X
4
One case in which tax evasion was established is EL Du Pont de
Nemours and Co. v. United States." The company opened a wholly
owned subsidiary in Europe to market and distribute Du Pont's prod-
ucts abroad. At the same time, it actively pursued the tax benefits to be
gained by transfer-pricing those goods to the European subsidiary.' '
107. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
108. W. Braun Co. v. Comm'r, 396 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1968).
109. Id at 269.
110. Johnson Bronze Co. v. Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1542, 1552 (1965).
111. Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc., 42 T.C. at 618.
112. Id
113. W. Braun Co., 396 F.2d at 268.
114. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1970).
115. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. C1. 1979).
116. The court stated,
While it appears that... [Du Pont's] proposal to place a marketing management
apparatus in Europe was primarily motivated by a desire to further... commer-
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The company executives wrote numerous reports and memoranda
baldly stating their intention to exploit the tax advantages of profit-
parking." 7 The incriminating documents simplified the task of investi-
gators who sought to tie together disparate trades, deals, and business
results into a framework indicating tax evasion.
Such documentation is not always so obligingly provided by the
target of the IRS investigation and suit."t 8 In these instances, a safer
route for the IRS to follow is to establish that as a result of the foreign
subsidiary operation, the income of the domestic parent is distorted in
its United States tax returns. 19 In such a case, the existence of a bona
fide business purpose will not protect the income from reallocation.12 0
Whether the distortion results from "inadvertence or design,"'' section
482 will apply to realign the income and recapture the lost tax revenue.
In the case of the hypothetical French bank, would the IRS be able
to establish that the Bahamian branch is a sham and lacks a sound
business reason for its existence? Given the nature of offshore banking,
one might easily indict the entire system as one designed solely to
evade taxes on income earned in industrialized countries like the
United States.' 22 An equally forceful argument, however, can be made
on behalf of business interests which view tax-haven countries simply
cial self-interest, rather than to create a tax sinecure,. . . [Du Pont] definitely and
openly favored taking full advantage of all incidental opportunities for tax minimi-
zation-particularly if. . .untaxed domestic manufacturing profits could be accu-
mulated abroad.
78-1 U.S.T.C. 83,899, 9374 (1978).
117. Id
118. See Reiner, How IRS Exchanges Tax Information With Other Countries, 31 TAX
EXECUTIVE 305, 312-13 (1979).
119. Van Dale Corp. v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 390 (1972). The court in Pan Dale discusses for
the first time the minimum which is required to activate application of section 482:
Section 482 does not permit respondent [IRS] to make allocations where there is no
distortion of income or evasion of taxes through use of a related corporation, nor
does it permit respondent to disregard corporate entities. . . . In this case peti-
tioner's gross income would have been no greater if it had sold the patents to a
corporation with which it had no ties. For this reason we find respondent's alloca-
tion under section 482 to be unreasonable. . . .Unless the tax benefit stems from
less than arm's-length dealings, the threshold point for applying section 482 is sim-
ply not reached.
Id at 398. See also Ruddick Corp. v. United States, 643 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
120. Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc., 42 T.C. at 621; Morines, Inc. v, Comm'r, 43 T.C.M.
(CCH) 329, 335 (1982); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton, 435 F.2d at 185; Eli Lilly & Co. v, United
States, 372 F.2d 990, 998-99 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
121. Ruddick, 643 F.2d at 750 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968)),
122. Underground Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House




as a means to maximize profit. Even if the IRS were foolhardy enough
to ask the United States courts to brand offshore banking as an outlaw
system, one doubts whether the courts would be so rash as to tackle the
thorny question on that philosophical level.
A more politic maneuver for the IRS would be to sidestep the
question of whether the hypothetical bank's Bahamian branch is a
sham and to concentrate instead on establishing either tax evasion or
income distortion, neither of which is affected by the presence or ab-
sence of a bona fide business purpose.'23 By creating a series of blatant
memoranda and resulting telexes first setting up the funds-parking sys-
tem and then carrying it out, the bank has left an audit trail as broad as
that in the Du Pont case.124 The IRS would stand an excellent chance
of succeeding in a section 482 reallocation if these documents could be
presented as evidence."
Should the documents be unavailable, however, the IRS might still
attempt to establish reallocation based on a distortion of the New York
branch's income, a distortion resulting from the shifting of foreign ex-
change profits to the Bahamas. The methods by which such a differ-
ence in income can be calculated for recapture are discussed in the
following section.
4. Standards for Measuring Reallocation
Transfer pricing 26 is a method of manipulating prices on goods
sold by a parent company to its subsidiary in an effort to shift as much
of the profit as possible to the low-tax jurisdiction in which the subsidi-
ary is located. If the subsidiary is merely a sham and serves no busi-
ness purpose, the IRS under section 482 may recapture all of the
subsidiary's profits and consolidate them with the parent's income for
taxation.127 However, if the subsidiary is not a sham and is actually a
functioning trade or business, how does the IRS determine whether the
prices charged, the amount of overhead allocated, or the percentage of
profit granted from parent to subsidiary is fair and does not distort the
parent's income?
Prior to the enactment in 1968 of expanded Treasury Regulations
123. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
124. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 608 F.2d at 447.
125. Whether the IRS could compel production of documents, memoranda, trade slips,
and telexes from a foreign bank and its non-United States branches is a complex question
and a lengthy topic in itself; accordingly, the subject will not be covered here.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
127. See I.T. 2261, 5-1 C.B. 100, modfledby I.T. 2394, 7-1 C.B. 177 (1928).
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accompanying section 482, courts relied almost exclusively on an
"arm's-length" test; 128 that is, the proper price, charge, or profit would
be the same as that which would prevail between unrelated parties op-
erating in a competitive manner, at arm's length from each other. 129
The arm's length method was applied in 1967 in El/Lily and Co. v.
United States. 3 ' In the 1940's and 1950's, Eli Lilly, a prominent
United States pharmaceutical manufacturer, sought to expand its over-
seas market through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries. For admin-
istrative reasons one of these subsidiaries became the distribution link
between the parent company and the other subsidiaries abroad.13' The
court found that Eli Lilly had no ulterior motive of tax evasion.13 2
Under this distribution arrangement, the parent sold to distributor at a
set price and distributor sold to subsidiaries at market price. This price
differential tended to build up large profits in the distributor because
the distributor was outside the United States, and the profits were not
taxable as long as they were held abroad. 33 The distribution system
was effectively holding the parent company's profits artificially low
while shifting the income to a subsidiary which was not subject to
United States tax.
The IRS reallocated the profits between the parent and the subsid-
iary by calculating the arm's length prices which should have prevailed
between the affiliates if they were "uncontrolled" purchasers. 34 The
court particularly noted that reallocation was appropriate despite the
sound business reasons underlying the organization of the distribution
system and the lack of tax avoidance motive. 35
128. See Oil Base, Inc. v. Comm'r, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966); Eli Lilly, 372 F.2d
at 996-98; Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours,
608 F.2d at 450; U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Lufkin
Foundry & Machine Co. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 400 (1971); Mornes, 43 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 334.
129. Another aspect of the arm's length standard which has occasionally been adopted
by courts is called the primary benefit test, which like arm's length adheres to the principle
of substance-over-form. This test has been applied particularly in section 482 reallocations
when the result of a transfer between related entities could be construed as a constructive
dividend. See, e.g., R.T. French Co. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 836, 855 (1973); White Tool &
Machine Co. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1980), ajf'd, 677 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1982).
For an interesting discussion of constructive dividends created through section 482, see Cliff
& Cohen, Collateral Fictions and Section 482, 36 TAX LAW. 37-59 (1982).
130. 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
131. Id at 992-94.
132. Id at 992-996.
133. I.R.C. § 911 (1976).
134. Eli Lilly, 372 F.2d at 995-97.
135. Id at 998-99.
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In the hypothetical French bank case, the principles of Eli Lill ,
can be applied. Just as pharmaceuticals were sold at off-market prices
among related companies of Eli Lilly, the French bank can also sell a
commodity (foreign currency) to its affiliates at prices less than arm's
length. The reallocation of Eli Lilly's income shows that the lack of tax
evasion motive is irrelevant despite the hypothetical bank's wish to pro-
tect its income from United States taxes. In the event that the IRS was
unable to discover the memoranda from Paris instigating the funds-
transfer mechanism, section 482 could still be applied "clearly to reflect
the income"'13 6 of the New York branch.
With the enactment of new regulations 137 in 1968, however, addi-
tional methods elaborating on the arm's length standard for calculating
fair prices were sanctioned. The complexity of the situations in which
section 482 may be applied is recognized in the formulation of these
methods, one of which applies particularly well to foreign exchange
trading.
Although currency changing hands is generally construed either as
payment for the sale of some object or as a loan, foreign currency
traded on the open market is a commodity, a thing which is bought and
sold. Its price is determined by its value relative to other currencies.8
Therefore, as a thing bought and sold, foreign currency should be char-
acterized as tangible property in choosing the method of reallocating
profits from its purchase or sale.
In attempting to reallocate profits from the purchase or sale of tan-
gible property between related businesses, one permissible approach is
the comparable uncontrolled price method, in which the "arm's length
price of a controlled sale is equal to the price paid in comparable un-
controlled sales. . .. ,"3 That rule readily lends itself to reapportion-
ing the profits from foreign exchange trades between related parties,
because any trades contrived to shift profits would not be at prevailing
exchange rates.
The comparable uncontrolled price method was used unsuccess-
fully by the IRS in 1970 to attempt reallocation of income in PPG In-
dustries, Inc. v. Commissioner.14 PPG Industries was a United States
manufacturer of glass, paint, and chemical products; the parent com-
136. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
137. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1 (1968).
138. Rev. RuL 74-218, 1974-1 C.B. 202; Rev. RuL 75-104, 1975-1 C.B. 18; Rev. Rul. 74-7,
1974-I C.B. 198.
139. Treas. Reg. § IA82-2(e)(2)(i) (1968).
140. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
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pany established a wholly owned subsidiary in Switzerland for the pur-
pose of marketing the parent company's products abroad.' 4' The
prices at which the goods were transferred from parent to subsidiary
were calculated by first determining the desired profit margin for the
parent and then adding that figure to the cost of manufacture by the
parent company, plus overhead attributable to the subsidiary. 142 De-
spite the inference from this pricing structure that the parent company
was attempting to maximize the flow of funds out of the United States
to Switzerland, 143 the court declined to sustain the reallocation because
PPG was able to present evidence of comparable uncontrolled sales by
other companies operating in Europe."
The hypothetical bank could be expected to attempt such proof as
well, to show that its branches made foreign exchange trades on the
same dates at similar rates in the same currencies with third-party
banks as were actually made in the funds-parking transactions. Such a
showing would substantiate a claim of arm's length dealing. The hypo-
thetical bank would be unable to make such a showing, however, be-
cause to trade in the hypersensitive foreign exchange market at off-
market rates is tantamount to financial suicide. To attempt to sell cur-
rency at rates higher than those prevailing on the market will meet with
silence from third parties; if there is no profit to be made, there is no
point to making a trade. Therefore, foreign exchange rates which devi-
ate even slightly from current market rates will not be found among
arm's length trading parties; off-market rates between related parties
are a sure sign of an ulterior motive, such as profit-shifting.
Thus, attempts by the hypothetical bank to show, as PPG did, that
its trades with affiliates are comparable to other arm's length trades
would be unsuccessful and would leave the IRS free to reallocate the
New York branch's income back to the United States from the
Bahamas.
B. Other Issues
1. Burden of Proof
In all applications of section 482, the burden of proof has lain
heavily on the taxpayer to show that the IRS reallocation is "unreason-
141. Id at 992.
142. Id
143. Swiss taxes on foreign corporate income where the corporation has permanent
branches in Switzerland are a conglomerate of national defense, cantonal, and communal
taxes which range from 5% to 36.8%. PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., supra note 53, at 227.
144. PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. at 994-95.
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able, arbitrary or capricious."'14 5 Courts continue to use this standard
even though it may seem to force taxpayers to prove their own
innocence. 146
Thus, the hypothetical French bank can be expected to bear the
burden of proof. The cases in which the courts have held for the tax-
payer and against reallocation by the IRS are factually based and
strongly rooted in a common sense approach, for example, denying a
reallocation where no shifting of income or distortion took place.
47
2. Abuse of Discretion
Since section 482 empowers the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue to reallocate at his discretion, 1 48 taxpayers have occasionally tried
to prove abuse of discretion by the Commissioner and have sometimes
succeeded. In Bush Hog Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 49 the
court found abuse of discretion because although the parent company
had the power to shift income to the subsidiary, there was no evidence
that it had done so or that fees charged to the subsidiary by the parent
to cover overhead were unfair. 50 In other words, the court disap-
proved of the IRS attempting to create wrongdoing where none existed.
In the case of the hypothetical bank, however, evidence of profit shift-
ing and unfair rates in foreign exchange deals is present and thus
removes the bank's possible complaint of arbitrary action by the
Commissioner.
3. Constitutionality of Section 482
The unconstitutionality of section 482 has been argued on two
grounds: as a violation of due process, and as a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. Neither argument has had any success.
InAsiatic Petroleum "I in 1935, the taxpayer claimed a violation of
due process by the United States seeking to tax the parent company on
the income reallocated from the supposed earner of the shifted income,
the subsidiary. The court rejected this argument and held that the sec-
145. Oil Base, Inc., 362 F.2d at 214; Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc., 42 T.C. at 621; Lufkin
Foundry & Machine Co., 30 T.C.M. (CCH) at 437; Mornes, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 333; Fos-
ter, 80 T.C. at 178.
146. See supra note 143.
147. See, eg., PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. 928.
148. LR.C. § 482 (1976).
149. Bush Hog Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 713 (1964).
150. Id at 723.
151. Asiatic Petroleum, 79 F.2d at 238.
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tion 482 reallocation was instead "looking through form to reality." 152
More recently, in the Ninth Circuit, the taxpayer in Foster v. Com-
missioner153 claimed violation by the IRS of the nondelegation doc-
trine, arguing that "section 482 is unconstitutional because it purports
to vest in the Commissioner the discretion to disregard the statutory
structure established by Congress for the taxation of corporations with-
out setting forth a meaningful standard"'15 4 by which to be guided. The
court refused to recognize this argument on the grounds that the clause
reading "necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income"'5 5 in section 482 is a sufficient standard. Further-
more, since 1935 the nondelegation doctrine has been a dead letter.
56
Should the hypothetical bank seek to invalidate section 482 as un-
constitutional, it could be expected to fail utterly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 482 has been applied to ever more complex international
situations since its inception some sixty years ago. From relatively sim-
ple recapture of a foreign subsidiary's entire income to fine-tuned cal-
culations of profit margins and comparable sales, section 482 has
proven its flexibility. It is just that quality of adaptability which makes
section 482 a formidable weapon in the hands of tile IRS, particularly
in pursuit of the entities which would seek to circumvent United States
tax laws by moving funds abroad. Although the IRS has not to date
publicly applied section 482 to reallocate from abroad United States-
source income of banks, the experience of the Western European gov-
ernments in the Edwards case should give the IRS reason to consider
further enlarging the uses of section 482.
152. Id
153. Foster, 80 T.C. at 141-42.
154. Foster, 80 T.C. at 141.
155. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
156. Foster, 80 T.C. at 142, citing 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 3:1, at
150 (2d ed. 1978).
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